Was the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) a Success? by Isar, Sarajuddin
Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 
Vol. 9, Iss. 1 (2012), Pp. 107 – 122 
 
 
Was the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative 
(HIPC) a Success? 
  
Sarajuddin Isar 
Department of Development Studies 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London 
 
Abstract 
Historically, the sustainability of long-term debts has been a primary concern 
for both indebted countries and those who finance their debts. In the late 1990s the 
Bretton Wood’s institutions (the International Monetary Fund, IMF, and the World 
Bank) launched the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiatives (HIPC I, 1996 and 
HIPC II, 1999) to reduce the burden of debt on highly indebted countries. If 
countries could meet certain complex criteria, the HIPC would stop the 
rescheduling of their debts. This article analyzes the effectiveness of the HIPC 
initiative and finds that its successes remain questionable.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The sustainability of long-term debt has been brought to the forefront of 
economic discussion in the last three decades. This concern has involved both the 
indebted countries and those who finance the debts as seen in a number of schemes 
from the Paris Club1 debt treatments on the terms of Toronto (1988), London (1991) 
and Naples (1995) to those of the IMF and the World Bank Highly Indebted Poor 
                                                 
1 The Paris Club refers to an informal group of creditor governments from 19 big 
economies of the world, which have been meeting regularly since 1956 to co-
ordinate debt restructuring, relief, and cancellation for indebted countries and their 
creditors. It has increasingly been granting larger debt reductions for the HIPCs. 
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Countries initiatives (HIPC I, 1996) and (HIPC II, 1999) and the Multilateral Debt 
Reduction Initiative2 (MDRI, 2005). 
The HIPC I & II, launched in 1996 and 1999 respectively, were particularly 
notable schemes. These initiatives differed because of the involvement of multilateral 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank (Spratt, 2009, p. 246). The HIPC 
initiative was proposed to reduce the burden of debt on highly indebted countries 
after meeting certain criteria and to stop the process of repeatedly rescheduling their 
debts. 
The success of this initiative has remained a controversial matter today, 
drawing interdisciplinary discussion with scholars from a variety of fields.  
The initial section provides some background on both the HIPC I and II 
initiatives while section three discusses the theoretical and empirical literature and 
analyzes critical shortcomings of the initiatives. The last two sections briefly highlight 
the paper suggestions and findings and concluding remarks respectively.  
 
2. Background 
 
The initiative has gone through two stages: the HIPC I, the original HIPC or 
O-HIPC, and the HIPC II, or the enhanced HIPC. 
 
2.1 The HIPC I: 
 
The HIPC was launched in September 1996 in response to increasing 
pressure for debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries. It also aimed to 
permanently end repeated rescheduling of debts for these countries (Addison, 
Hansen and Tarp, 2004, p. 24).  
The HIPC I was initially intended to reduce the burden of debt in the 
poorest economies. To be eligible for debt relief a poor country’s macroeconomic 
policy should be robust from the IMF and the World Bank perspective after a six 
year term and a number of complex criteria had to be met, including those of debt 
sustainability. 
Under the HIPC I, the debt relief mechanism necessitated that a debtor 
country undergo structural reforms in its economy to be eligible for concessional 
loans from the IMF and the World Bank. The first of these was to form a “flow-
rescheduling agreement” with Paris Club creditors regarding concessional terms. The 
second was to ensure a good track record of meeting IMF arrangements and 
                                                 
 
2 The MDRI refers to a new initiative of debt relief proposed by G8’s meeting of 
Gleneagles in June 2005 in which three multilateral institutions- the World Bank, 
International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank and the African 
Development Fund (AfDF) forgive 100% debts of countries who owe them only on 
their reaching to the completion point. Countries with per-capita income of $380 a 
year or less (whether HIPCs or not) will receive debt relief. Visit 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm) and 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:200409
42~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html). 
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rescheduling agreements. The “flow-rescheduling” agreement would apply when 
there was a reduction in the stock-of-debt over a three year period. Thirdly, the 
debtor country needed to seek comparable debt terms from private and bilateral 
creditors outside the Paris Club. Fourthly, the debtor country also needed to seek 
bilateral debt relief in the form of official development assistance (ODA) from other 
creditors. Only after meeting these concessions and terms could the debtor be re-
financed under the HIPC (Esquivel, Larraín and Sachs, 1998, p. 15). Under the 
HIPC I up to 80 percent of Net Present Value (NPV) of debt could be relieved by 
Paris Club creditors, but the exact value would be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Multilateral creditors would commit to lower their claims’ present values to ensure a 
sustainable debt level. However this too was to be decided on a case-by-case basis 
(Ibid).  
A country would be eligible to debt sustainability when it could meet its 
current and future external debt-service obligations in full and without needing 
alternatives to debt relief, debt rescheduling, accumulating the arrears and with no 
unduly compromising growth. The ratio of NPV of a country’s debt-to-exports 
would need to exceed 200-250%, the ratio of debt service-to-exports needed to be 
over the range of 20-25% (Boote and Thugge, 1997, p. 17) while the NPV of debt-
to-fiscal revenue needed to be over 280%. The minimum ratios of export-to-GDP 
and fiscal revenue-to-GDP would need to reach 40% and 20% respectively (Gautam 
2003, p12). 
Three years after its inception, the HIPC I was considered “not sufficient to 
provide HIPCs with a permanent exit” (G24, 2003, p. 1). It was further discovered 
to be too slow and stringent on qualifying criteria. In 1999 the HIPC I initiative was 
modified and re-presented as the enhanced HIPC, or the HIPC II.  
 
2.2 The HIPC II: 
 
The HIPC was considerably modified in 1999 based on a G7 proposal during a 
meeting in Cologne, Germany (Michaelow, 2002, p. 462) and is still in use today. 
Among the important changes are faster debt relief processes, expansion of relief 
plans for which more countries were eligible (Spratt, 2009 p. 249), creation of an 
interim process between the decision and completion points, addition of a floating 
completion point and requirement of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
from indebted county (Payne, 2005, p. 150).  For more on differences, see table 1. 
The HIPC II has three key objectives: To ensure debt sustainability and 
provide a permanent exit from rescheduling. The initiative aims to decrease the 
obligations of debt services so that the county can increase its export incomes and 
transfers in the future. It eliminates the need for future rescheduling, defensive 
lending, and debt forgiveness. Secondly, the initiative seeks to ensure an increasing 
long-term growth rate by removing overhung debts. Finally, it seeks to reduce the 
poverty rate by freeing up resources and promoting social spending to reduce cash 
debt-service payments (Gautam, 2003, p. 16). However these objectives come with 
the condition that only ‘poor’ countries are eligible for debt relief for sustainable 
debts. A country is considered poor when it depends on highly concessional 
financing from the concession lending-arm of the World Bank, the IMF and the 
International Development Association (G24, 2003, p. 1). 
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The debt sustainability criteria were also altered following the introduction of 
the HIPC II. The Net Present Value of debt-to-export was lowered from 200-250% 
to 150% while the debt-to-revenue was reduced from 280% to 250%. In addition, 
the minimum ratio of export-to-GDP and fiscal revenue-to-GDP each were reduced 
from 40% and 20% to 30% and 15% respectively (Gautam, 2003, p. 12). 
The HIPC II consists of two stages. The first is that the country should 
complete a three year term of good economic performance and sustained poverty 
reduction strategy papers. Following this, the IMF and the World Bank decide upon 
the sustainability of the country’s debt. At this, the decision point, a package of debt 
relief is determined (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 74-8) as shown in Figure 1 
below. 
After three years if the country’s debt is considered sustainable, it is not 
eligible for debt relief. However if the debts are judged unsustainable, the country 
moves on to the second stage and creditors commit the delivery of debt relief to the 
floating completion point. Additional policies are implemented during this stage and 
additional support from the IMF and the World Bank may reach the country on an 
interim basis. Finally if the second stage is deemed successful, the process reaches 
the completion point and all creditors act on their commitments from the decision 
point (Gautam 2003, ch. 4), (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 74-8) and (Spratt, 
2009, p. 248-9). This process is summarized in Figure 2.    
 
Figure 1: Enhanced HIPC Initiative Flow Chart: First Stage 
 
Decision Point  
 
                                Either                                                Or 
             
                                                                 
Figure 1 Enhanced HIPC initiative flow chart of first stage (Source: Teunissen and 
Akkerman 2004, 76) 
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Figure 2: Enhanced HIPC Initiative Flow Chart:  
Second Stage 
 
Floating Completion Point 
 
Figure 2 Enhanced HIPC initiative flow chart of second stage (source: Teunissen 
and Akkerman 2004, 77) 
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Figure 3 Summary of the Original and Enhanced HIPC (Source: Gautam, 2003, 12) 
 
3. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 
Following the observations of the mechanisms and criteria of the HIPC, this 
section examines theoretical and empirical evidence which suggest that, although the 
HIPC was desirable in countries which met the complex criteria, it excluded many 
and accumulated a number of critiques.  
Of 40 HIPCs, 32 achieved the completion point while the other four reached 
the decision point (as shown in the below table). The debt relief of these 36 
countries in post decision-point under the HIPC represents 35% of their total GDP 
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in 2010. The debt relief of HIPC initiative has cost its creditors an estimated amount 
of US$75 billion in 2010 present value terms (IMF, 2011, p. 2–5). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Highly Indebted Poor Countries in July 2011 (Source: IMF 2011, 2) 
 
The IMF (2011, p. 4) argues that concurrently to delivering debt relief, the 
HIPC also increased these countries’ poverty-reducing expenditure. From 2001 to 
2010, poverty reduction spending for the 36 post-decision point countries increased 
by over three percent point of GDP on average while debt service payment 
decreased by a relatively smaller amount. However, the development of HIPCs in 
some cases is limited progress as far as meeting Millennium Development goals is 
concerned. In most of the 32 countries which reached the completion-point, 
universal primary education can be achieved; however, almost half still cannot make 
additional reforms to meet this target. More than half of these countries still need to 
reach their targets pertaining to gender equality and the prevention of HIV/AIDS, 
TB and malaria spread. About half of these countries are on track to reduce mortality 
rate of children under five as well as ensure environmental sustainability targets.  
These countries face many challenges beyond just the high cost of debt relief. 
For instance, only a quarter of completion-point countries are on track to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1). There is even less certainty that these 
countries will improve maternal health as in the 6th millennium development goal. 
For instance, only a few are on track to build a global partnership for development 
(MDG 8) (Ibid).  
In addition to these challenges, the HIPC is also associated with a number of 
critiques which indicate that the initiative has been less successful than claimed by 
the IMF and the World Bank. These critiques are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.1 The Inappropriateness of the Initiative 
 
Despite the fact that the initiative was considerably modified under the 
enhanced HIPC, the suitability of the scheme remains questionable. The eligibility 
criteria and the debt sustainability indicators used by the HIPC are arguably 
completely inappropriate. A G24 paper (2003, p. 3) argues that the HIPC is 
114 Consilience 
 
extremely politically charged and uses IDA-only criterion. It suggests replacement by 
a more poverty-focused criterion to omit the two ratios applicable for fiscal criteria 
and to take into consideration other factors that could lead to vulnerability such as 
export concentration and export price volatility. There are still countries which are 
equally as poor and as indebted as the HIPCs but have exited the HIPC due to the 
inappropriate consideration of the criteria. 
For instance countries like Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea were HIPCs at 
first but were later excluded as they were not considered IDA-only eligible countries. 
This was particularly so in the case of Nigeria which was highly indebted and whose 
value of debt-to-export ratio was around 188%, 38% higher than what is eligible 
under the HIPC, and was a poor economy with GDP per capita below US$300 
(Gunter 2001, p. 19-20). 
Watkins (2004) claims that as a result of complexity in debt eligibility criteria, 
countries’ debt reliefs have either been repeatedly delayed or cut off as they could 
not meet the IMF loans conditions. Using debt relief as a force for deep structural 
reforms in difficult policies like privatization, civil service pay and utility management 
is difficult to justify.  
Another critique observed in Malawi is on the profits from improved hybrid 
types of maize which need substantial applications of fertilizer. Farmers were 
forbidden from being subsidized as this would be considered a breach of the criteria 
set under the free market mechanism (Dent and Peters, 1999, p. 54).  
The fact that most poor countries are ineligible for the HIPC initiative 
attracts much criticism. The reason that certain countries’ debts were not considered 
sustainable even though they were poor and heavily indebted as Gunter (2007, p. 7) 
observes is due to a very narrowly defined criterion of debt sustainability, particularly 
regarding debt-to-export and debt-to-revenue ratios as in the case of Nigeria 
discussed above.  
There is also similar empirical evidence in the cases of some other countries 
that have suffered the inappropriate treatment of the initiative. For instance, 
Bangladesh and Cambodia, despite having low GDPs per capita of US$413 and 
US$377 respectively in 2006, are not yet part of the HIPC while Ghana, whose GDP 
per capita was higher (US$ 457), is eligible for debt relief (Spratt, 2007, p. 8-9).   
 
3.2 Slowness of the Initiative 
 
The slowness of the HIPC has consistently been a matter of concern. For 
instance, by 1998, only seven countries (Uganda, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique and Benin) were actually issued with resolutions from 
the IMF and the World Bank, and only six of these countries were decided eligible. 
Benin’s debt was considered sustainable and therefore would not benefit from the 
initiative (Esquivel, Larraín and Sachs, 1998, p. 21). In this respect the World Bank 
and Gautam (2003, p. 27) argue that the initiative was only slow in the early years and 
was later expedited, particularly after the enhancement of the initiative. However the 
slowness of the process was also evident in the following years.  
For instance, by December 2003, the total number of countries that reached 
the completion point was only ten (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 7). This 
means that within six years after 1998, only four countries could achieve the 
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completion point. The slowness of the process further continued until 2009 and, as 
Spratt (2009, p. 251) argues, since 2004 only 15 countries are eligible to reach the 
HIPC completion point. 
Finally when three debtor countries, Bolivia, Uganda and Mauritania 
achieved the debt relief on the conditions set by the HIPC, they still had to wait for 
months until creditors could organize the distribution of the funds (Roy, 2000, p. 
27).  
 
3.3 Limited Coverage 
 
Over the decade and a half since the HIPC initiative was launched, the 
countries considered eligible for the HIPC are below 40. However the number of 
countries potentially eligible should be far higher.  
For instance, Dent and Peters (1999, p. 55) argue that the IMF and World 
Bank only predict 40 countries under HIPC, where in fact there are some 51 
countries which are in desperate need of debt remission.  
This critique has also been noticed in the UN report (1999, p. 16) which 
emphasizes that about half a dozen Global South countries are not covered in the 
HIPC although their debt indicators classify them as severely and moderately 
indebted and they are vulnerable to unfavorable external development. 
 
3.4 HIPC Ignores Economic Shocks 
 
The world has inevitably witnessed a number of economic shocks 
throughout history and many of these have been caused by exogenous factors which 
affected many poor economies beyond their control. The HIPC ignores the reality of 
such factors because countries, including those eligible for debt relief, as Addison, 
Hanson and Tarp (2004, p. 97) indicate, are usually subject to very wide variation in 
their terms of trade (TOT) and in their agricultural primary export volumes.  
Likely Payne (2004, p. 151) claims that the global fall of prices of 
commodities has harmfully affected the debt sustainability measurement in Africa, 
particularly in Uganda, despite being the first and the best performer of the HIPC.  
As a consequence of the global fall in commodity prices, the TOT for 
Uganda’s exports3 deteriorated. For instance during the decision point stage of 
HIPC, the three-year average value for exports earnings of Uganda for the year 
ending 2002-03 was projected over one billion dollars  while the actual value only 
amounted US$726 million, representing a 28% decline. Additionally, Tanzania, 
although it similarly reached the completion point, still remained vulnerable to 
exogenous economic shocks like adverse weather and deteriorating TOT (Teunissen 
and Akkerman, 2004, p. 22, 54, 61).  
Spratt (2009, p. 251) also argues that the secular fall of agricultural product 
prices lead to lower earnings from exports for most HIPCs despite their economies 
being based on a debt-to-export ratio.  
                                                 
3 Uganda’s economy is largely dependant on its agriculture, which almost supplies all of its foreign exchange 
earnings. Its coffee alone makes it the leading producer in Africa and accounted for 27% of its exports in 
2002. 
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Furthermore the IMF (2010, p. 2) itself admits the shortfall of this section of 
the initiative. It states that many countries are still vulnerable to shocks, particularly 
those which affect exports.   
The table below shows the continuous falling trend in prices of some real 
commodities from the 1970s to 2005. As can be seen in the table below, the prices of 
sugar and coffee between the 1970s and 2005 decreased by over three times. The 
decline for maize and rice was more than a half, whereas for butter and bananas, it 
was over 97 and 52 percent respectively for the same period (FAO, 2007, p. 42). 
 
 
Figure 5 Trend in Commodity Prices (Source: FAO 2006, 2) 
 
3.5 HIPC, Tool for the Creditors 
 
Trotsenburg from the World Bank and MacArthur from the IMF (1999) 
argue that the HIPC is a sound and effective instrument to provide a way out of the 
debt trap for poor countries. Yet, rather than being an effective instrument for debt 
relief in favor of poor countries, the initiatives have been strategic tools for creditor 
countries to realize their objectives. Enrique and et al (2007) argue that the HIPC 
was mainly designed to protect the interests of the creditors. It left countries with 
unsustainable debt burdens, even though they qualified for the decision point. 
The World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and that 
of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers framework and supporting matrix4 have 
not been developed to address the debt relief and poverty reduction in low income 
countries, but rather were means for intervening in the economic and social policy 
and political governance, trialed in most of the HIPCs dependant on the IMF and 
the World Bank (Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002, p. 50).  
Furthermore Sachs (2000) states that the IMF and the World Bank were 
instrumentally utilized tools by a few rich governments and that the debt 
sustainability criteria that they put forward for poor countries has nothing to do with 
actual debt sustainability. They ignore the deaths of millions of people who demand 
access to basic medication and nutrition.   
                                                 
4 In January 1999, the World Bank launched the CDF where its heart was constituted by a matrix which 
covered key policy issues in regards to four actors including those of the international development 
community, the governments, civil society and the private sector (Wilkinson and Hughes 2002, p36).  
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Even the treatment of certain countries by the IMF and the World Bank has 
been more favorable than their criteria would seem to allow under a strict 
interpretation of the rules. For instance, Payne claims that countries like Turkey, due 
to its geopolitical location in regards to the Middle East, Brazil, because of its good 
relationship with the fund and lately Iraq, whose 80% of US$39 billion debt owed to 
the Paris Club was forgiven after the re-election of President Bush are obvious 
examples where countries benefited for extraneous reasons over those that really 
deserved support. 
 
3.6 Other Shortcomings of  HIPC  
 
Other failures of the HIPC initiative are that it fails to address the human 
and social development perspective (EURODAD, 2001, p. 7) and that its PRSP does 
not do enough to deal with ethnic, religious and social tensions affecting the lives of 
most Africans (Gunter, 2002, p. 11). Furthermore it is criticized for having 
unrealistic and over-optimistic assumptions and projections of growth (Teunissen 
and Akkerman, 2004, p. 6-7) (Addison, Hansen and Tarp 2004, p45).  
The HIPC also omits other types of debts, such as domestic and private 
sectors, which are becoming more predominant in low-income countries. The 
thresholds of debt sustainability particularly those of debt-to-export and debt-to 
revenue ratio are still high (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 14-8) and the initiative 
was not supported with funding from the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
Additionally the program designed for six years was too long with too little flexibility 
to meet the individual needs of debtor nations (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 
62), (Spratt, 2006, p. 8-11), (Enrique and et al, 2007) (Spratt, 2010, p. 250).  
Third, the IMF and the World Bank did not commit to cancel any debt 
unless the debtor country reached the completion point. This left countries under 
the pressure of debt payments while they also struggled to institute structural 
reforms (Enrique and et al, 2007).  
Fourthly, any efforts of poverty reduction were weakened by Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) conditions. For instance, privatizing the 
utilities led to rising service costs which were beyond the ability of citizens to pay 
(Ibid).  
Finally the funding allocated for development under the initiative was 
insufficient for long-term progress (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 7), (UN, 
1999, p. 15) (Addison, Hansen and Tarp, 2004, p. 45). 
 
3.7 Suggestions 
Although the HIPC was relatively successful in countries which met the 
criteria, it was associated with a number of challenges and shortcomings discussed 
previously. The following modifications could improve the success of the HIPC: 
The complex criteria need further enhancement and modification despite 
modification under the HIPC II. The only-IDA criterion limits the ability of many 
poor countries to qualify for debt relief. As a G24 paper (2003, p. 3) argues, the 
IDA-only criterion should be replaced by a more poverty-focused criterion to omit 
the two ratios pertaining to the fiscal criterion and must take into consideration other 
factors of vulnerability such as export concentration and export price volatility. Many 
118 Consilience 
 
countries, equally as poor and indebted as the HIPCs, have exited the HIPC due to 
the limited scope of the criteria. The slow process of the HIPC should be expedited 
as many more countries with immediate needs have the potential to be eligible for 
debt relief. As discussed earlier, by December 2003 the total number of countries 
that reached the completion point was ten (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2004, p. 7) 
while by 2009 the number was only 15 (Spratt, 2009, p. 251). 32 out of 40 HIPCs 
had to wait for over one and a half decades to reach the completion point.  
Only 40 countries meet the IDA-only criterion while there are many other 
countries that need support. As Dent and Peters (1999, p. 55) argue, there are 51 
potential HIPCs in desperate need of debt remission. A UN report (1999, p. 16) 
noted that about half a dozen LDCs are not covered by the HIPC although their 
debt indicators classify them as severely and moderately indebted countries which are 
furthermore vulnerable to unfavorable external development. Thus the limited list 
needs further expansion to include other potential HIPCs. 
The HIPC is meant to be a financial tool to help relieve the debt burden of 
poor countries. However it has been politicked and instrumentalized to ensure the 
interests of creditor countries. Creditors, the IMF and the World Bank show 
favoritism which may eventually lead to resistance and uprising, especially likely in 
this financial crisis, as a result of which the HIPC may inevitably collapse. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
The HIPC initiative cannot be considered an absolute failure or success. 
However, available theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the initiative has 
been associated with a number of shortcomings which raise doubts about its success.  
It was discovered that the HIPC rests on a number of complex criteria which 
restrict eligible conditions. Empirical evidence has analyzed the cases of Bangladesh 
and Cambodia. Although these countries were poor and highly indebted they were 
not able to meet the criteria. Similarly Nigeria, although only eligible for debt relief, 
was still excluded because it was not an IDA-only country. Bangladesh and 
Cambodia in spite of being poor and highly indebted have not yet been included in 
the HIPC.  
The HIPC is also a very slow process. For instance Bolivia, Mauritania and 
particularly Uganda, the first and best candidate of the HIPC, had to wait for months 
until their creditors distributed the responsibility of funding the relief. By 2009 only 
15 countries had reached the completion point of the HIPC.  
More importantly, the HIPC ignores exogenous economic shocks that 
unavoidably affect many debt-burdened countries. In the case of Uganda, the fall of 
global commodity prices damaged its economy and particularly its exports, a main 
source of its foreign exchange earnings. Even the IMF, creator of this initiative, 
confessed this failure.  
Most significantly, the HIPC initiative, rather than being a useful mechanism 
for countries to reduce their debt burden and develop their economies, has been a 
tool for larger economies to influence global governance and maintain smaller 
countries dependence on biased decisions. Therefore, this essay concludes that the 
HIPC cannot be an entirely successful initiative unless its current criteria and 
mechanisms are either substantially replaced or modified.   
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